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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD DUNLAP, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20080923-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
As a preliminary matter Dunlap would like to readdress the standard of review. In 
the opening brief Dunlap cited Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 
1993) for the proposition that when the trial court's interpretation of a statute controls the 
admission of evidence it is reviewed for correctness. Appellant's Brief at 1. In its brief, 
the State claimed that this Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Appellee's Brief at 1 (citing State v. Vialpando, 2004 
UT App 95, Tf 8, 89 P.3d 209). Although both these claims are true this case requires 
more specificity. Dunlap has not only challenged the trial court's application of law to 
fact in its decision to admit the intoxilyzer results, he has also challenged the trial court's 
interpretation of the laws controlling the admission of evidence. Thus, this case requires 
the application of two standards of review. When reviewing the trial court's 
interpretations of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the Administrative statutes regulating 
the use of intoxilyzers, this Court should review for correctness. When reviewing the 
trial court's application of those laws or rules to the facts of this case this Court should 
review for an abuse of discretion. 
This Reply Brief will follow the State's brief issue by issue. Dunlap argues that the 
trial court erred by admitting evidence of the results of intoxilyzer tests performed upon 
him after the State failed to meet the statutory requirements for reliability. The trial court 
also erred by denying Dunlap's hearsay objections to two witness' statements regarding 
the digital readout of the intoxilyzer machine. Finally, Dunlap claims that the trial 
court's errors and abuse of discretion were harmful because there is a reasonable 
likelihood that admission of the intoxilyzer evidence affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. 
I. THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE WAS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY 
ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS, THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS 
As discussed in Dunlap's opening brief, in order for a trial court to admit evidence 
of an intoxilyzer breath test there must be proof "that (1) the intoxilyzer machine had 
been properly checked by a trained technician, and that the machine was in proper 
working condition at the time of the test; (2) that the test was administered correctly by a 
qualified operator; and (3) a police officer observed the defendant during the fifteen 
minutes immediately preceding the test to ensure that the defendant introduced nothing 
into his or her mouth during that time." Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, f^ 14. Dunlap has 
challenged the trial court's finding that the machine was in proper working condition 
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based on the undisputed fact that on both occasions when Dunlap was subjected to an 
intoxilyzer test the machine failed to print the results of the test because the "paper feed 
sensor was out of align." R. 138: 158. In the State's brief it has argued that the 
malfunctioning printer is insufficient to show that the intoxilyzer was 'not working 
properly.' See Appellee's Brief at 10-12. 
A. The administrative standards require the intoxilyzer machines to produce 
printed results. 
In response to Dunlap's opening brief the State criticizes Dunlap's use of R.714-
500-7(C) which states that "[rjesults of breath alcohol concentration tests will be printed 
by the instrument" because "a functioning printer is not required for a finding that the 
instrument is working." Appellee's Brief at 11. The State cites Administrative Code 
R.714-500-6(D)(4) to support the notion that if a machine passes eight certification 
checks "it shall be deemed to be operating properly" and that a properly functioning 
printer is not among those eight items to be checked. Appellee's Brief at 11. Dunlap 
asserts that the State's reading of the statute is flawed, however, because the eight items 
listed in section 6(D)(2) are not the only items to be checked during certification. 
According to the statute, "[t]he program supervisor shall establish a standardized 
operating procedure for performing certification checks, following requirements set forth 
in R714-500 or by using such procedures as recommended by the manufacturer of the 
instrument to meet its performance specifications, as derived from:" and then the eight 
items are listed. UTAH ADMIN. R.714-500-6(D)(2). According to the statute the program 
supervisor will determine what must be properly functioning in order for a machine to 
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pass the certification check. As noted in that same section, the standard operating 
procedures created by the program supervisor are available at the Utah Highway Patrol 
Training Section and include functions beyond the eight listed in the statute and argued as 
the only criteria for 'operating properly' by the State. Dunlap has obtained a copy of the 
standard operating procedures and has attached them as addendum for the Court's 
convenience. See Addenda. Dunlap would specifically direct the Court's attention to 
"Certification Report Line 9, Printout Verification Check" where a technician must verify 
that the machine "gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath on the 
printout" Addenda (emphasis added). According to the standard operating procedures 
established by the program supervior a machine that does not give a reading in grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath on a printout is not "deemed to be operating properly." 
R.714.-500-6(D)(2). 
Therefore, Dunlap's reliance on 7(C)'s print-out requirement was appropriate 
because standards for the certification checks established by the program supervisor were 
in part created by the requirements set forth in R.714-500-7(C). Any machine that does 
not print its results, and any machine that does not record its results in the proper 
terminology and decimal points, would not be following the standard requirements for 
certification set by the program supervisor. UTAH ADMIN. R.714-500-7(B)(2). Despite 
the State's assertion to the contrary, a functioning printer is a requirement for a finding 
that an instrument is working properly. 
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B. The failure of the machine to produce printed results has a direct effect on 
the reliability of the evidence. 
The State has also alleged that Vialpando does not require a functioning printer 
because the printer has nothing to do with the reliability of the results of a test. 
Appellee's Brief at 12. The State argues that "Trooper Moore testified that the printer 
alignment problem on the Intoxilyzer in this case had no effect on the accuracy of the 
machine and that when she repaired the printer, no other repairs were required." 
Appellee's Brief at 12 (citing R. 138: 158-59). What the State fails to recognize is that 
the reliability requirements from and Vialpando extend beyond concern for the accuracy 
of the test results. While a malfunctioning printer may not have any effect upon the 
accuracy of the machine's internal analysis, the fact that the printer was malfunctioning 
unquestionably affects the reliability of the intoxilyzer as a whole because it affects the 
means of creating evidence, and the reliability of the test results as evidence presented at 
a criminal trial. While the maintenance records and the certification affidavits support 
the reliability of the internal analysis performed by the test, the printed card supports the 
reliability of the results evidence presented at trial. 
It is not the case, as the State asserts, that the malfunctioning printer is unrelated to 
the reliability of the test results evidence. To the contrary, the printed cards are the 
means by which the Legislature has assured that accurate evidence of these tests can be 
preserved and presented as proof of intoxication. The printed card eliminates the threat 
of bias or mistake on the part of the reporting officer. The printed card itself is a 
requirement and useful in its own right and is not an insignificant part of the breath test 
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process. Where the police fail to create and present this record the trial court should not 
be allowed to ignore this requirement simply because it does not influence the reliability 
of another requirement, the internal analysis of the breath. 
C. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting the results of the 
intoxilyzer tests after the State failed to meet its burden. 
As noted in Dunlap's original brief, the trial court originally prevented evidence of 
the intoxilyzer results from Deputy Randall because from her testimony it was 
"absolutely conclusive that this machine was acting up." R. 137: 126-27. At that point it 
appears the trial court believed that the intoxilyzer was not functioning properly. 
Unfortunately, rather than making a formal finding whether or not that the intoxilyzer 
was properly functioning, after hearing Trooper Moore's testimony about his repairs of 
the machine, the trial court merely allowed Randall and Thompson to testify about the 
test results evidence. Oddly, nothing in Moore's testimony contradicted the fact that the 
machine was acting up; in fact he testified that he was called out to make a repair on the 
machine because there was a malfunction and that he repaired the broken paper feed 
sensor on October 11, 2005. R. 138:154-58. It does not follow that the trial court would, 
after hearing Moore's testimony, find that the machine was not malfunctioning. But the 
court disregarded its earlier adherence to the rule and more evidence supporting a 
continued finding that the machine was malfunctioning, and allowed Randall and 
Thompson to testify to the test result, in essence (although not explicitly) finding the 
machine was functioning properly. The court changed its mind after receiving more 
uncontroverted evidence that the machine was not operating properly according to the 
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rule. Dunlap asserts that admitting the test results following these facts was 
unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion. 
This Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court, even where 
there is reason to suspect that the trial court found some questionable evidence credible, 
because "such assessments clearly lie in the hands of the trial court[.]" Vialpando, at Tf 17. 
But where a court finds a fact completely at odds with the evidence presented there is a 
clear error. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 48-49, 63 P.3d 650, 663 (Utah Supreme 
Court upheld a trial court's finding of consent where there were alternative interpretations 
to the facts presented). Here there is no alternative, given the testimony, to the fact that 
the machine was malfunctioning. According to the court, Randall's initial testimony was 
"absolutely conclusive that this machine was acting up[.]" R. 137: 128-27. Moore then 
testified that "[t]he paper feed sensor was out of align" meaning that the printer will stop 
and print over itself. R. 138: 158. The trial court should not have found that the machine 
was operating properly after having found that it was malfunctioning after only hearing 
Moore's testimony supporting that position. 
In this case there is no alternative explanation to these facts, the machine was 
malfunctioning, and there is no reason to think the trial court would not find these 
testimonies credible, especially where it is the State's burden to prove the machine was 
functioning and it was their witnesses testifying that it was not. Dunlap asserts that this, 
unlike Hansen or Vialpando, is a situation where the facts are clear and the trial court 
simply exceeded its discretion. Therefore, this Court should substitute its judgment for 
the trial court's clearly erroneous finding. 
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II. RESULTS OF AN INTOXILYZER TEST CONSTITUTE A STATEMENT 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF HEARSAY UNDER RULE 801, THUS THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT HEARSAY DID NOT APPLY 
To be clear, Dimlap does not assert that if the Court finds that the intoxilyzer test 
results were admitted properly according to R.714-500 and the requirements of 
Vialpando, that it may still be excluded as hearsay. R.714-500 is a statutory exception to 
the hearsay rule so long as its requirements are met. If the test results meet those 
requirements then there are no hearsay problems. But, if the Court finds, as has been 
asserted above, that the State failed to meet the requirements of R.714-500 and 
Vialpando, evidence of the police officers' witnessing the digital readout of the 
intoxilyzer should not be allowed as eye-witness accounts of an event because such 
testimony violates hearsay. In other words, if the evidence is not admissible as reliable 
results of a properly performed test from a certified instrument, the statutory hearsay 
exception does not apply, and thus the evidence must be subject to a traditional hearsay 
review. Dunlap asserts that although Deputy Randall and Thompson saw the digital 
readout of the intoxilyzer machine they should not have been permitted to testify to what 
they saw because it is inadmissible hearsay and not merely an observation. 
In its brief, the State claims that the trial court correctly ruled that the testimony 
regarding the breath test was not hearsay and defends that position by arguing that 
hearsay can only come from declarants. It cites to Rule 801(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence arguing a declarant is a person who makes a statement, and the intoxilyzer 
machine is not a person and therefore cannot be a declarant. Appellee's Brief at 13-14. 
The State's argument is essentially the logical reverse of the argument in Dunlap's 
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opening brief. See Appellant's Brief at 15 (hearsay is an out of court statement offered to 
prove the proof thereof, statements are assertions, the results of the intoxilyzer test are 
assertions other than made by the declarant/witness while testifying at trial offered to 
prove the truth of the matter). "[W]hether a statute prevents the admission of evidence 
depends on its interpretation, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law." Salt Lake v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993). These 
conflicting arguments arise as a matter of statutory interpretation, as did the trial court's 
decision that, because the machine could not be cross-examined, the test results were not 
hearsay. R. 138: 203. As a matter of statutory interpretation, this Court reviews the trial 
court's ruling for correctness. This Court "accord[s] a lower court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assess[es] them for correctness[.]" Emerson, 
861P.2d443,445. 
A. Hearsay does not require a declarant/person. 
As mentioned above, Dunlap and the State have different positions as to the 
meaning of the hearsay rule. Dunlap asserts that the key to this disagreement can be 
found in 801(c). "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." The State focuses on the "other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing" and argues that this means hearsay may only come from 
a declarant. The State then looks to section (b) and finds that "[a] 'declarant' is a person 
who makes a statement" and argues that declarants are people and only therefore only 
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people can make statements. This logic is flawed and does not accurately reflect a 
careful reading of the text of the rule. 
The word declarant in section (c) is defining a situation where a statement would 
not be hearsay rather than defining what hearsay is. In other words, hearsay is not a 
statement made by a declarant while testifying at trial (otherwise known as a witness), 
meaning that statements made by witnesses at trial are not hearsay. But in all other cases, 
statements offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay. That is 
the limit of section (c). In order to further understand what hearsay is logic then directs 
one to ask what a statement is, rather than ask what a declarant is. Rule 801(a) defines 
statement as two distinct things. A statement is either "(1) an oral or written assertion" or 
"(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." The 
'or' in this case is disjunctive and means that a statement can be one of the following, and 
need not be both. A statement can just be an oral or written assertion, period. The State 
has emphasized the word 'person' to suggest that a person is required in order to have a 
statement however the word 'person' in section (a) clearly only creates a requirement for 
the (2) 'nonverbal conduct' kind of statement and not the (1) 'assertion' kind of 
statement. Therefore, a statement does not require a person nor does hearsay require a 
declarant. 
In spite of the clear language of the rule the State rejects Dunlap's claim that the 
intoxilyzer results constitute hearsay because it claims that "the hearsay rule governs 
statements made by persons, not digital readouts from machines." Appellee's Brief at 13. 
To support that position, the State cites three cases, all of which are from outside Utah, 
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and one of which deals with confrontation and not hearsay. First the State cites People v. 
Buckner, _ P.3d _ , 2009 WL 3297587 (Colo. App. 2009) where the defendant was 
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance for selling crack cocaine to an 
undercover officer. The defendant objected to the introduction of his cellular telephone 
into evidence claiming that it contained information that was inadmissible as hearsay. 
Buckner, *2. The prosecutor admitted the "telephone to show that the defendant had 
spoken to the undercover officer who had arranged the drug sale" by showing the 
officer's phone number was stored in the defendant's phone. Buckner, *3. The court 
found that such "information involve[d] neither a 'declarant' not a 'statement' within the 
meaning of the rules barring hearsay." Id. 
Dunlap would assert that the 'declarant' part of this decision suffers from the same 
loose reading of the hearsay rule as does the State's position but the mistake is less 
important in that case because, as the court ruled, there was no assertion made by listing a 
telephone number in a call log. Dunlap would distinguish his case from Buckner by 
noting that the result of the intoxilyzer test is much more of an assertion than the 
automatic appearance of a number in a phone's call log, and in the case of the test results, 
they are admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. 
Next, the State cites Bowe v. State, 785 So.2d 531 (Fla. App. 2001) where the 
defendant appealed his conviction based on admission of caller I.D. information and 
pager messages. An informant sent a pager message to the defendant from a police 
phone line with a coded message inferring he wanted to buy cocaine and the defendant 
called back. Bowe, 785 So.2d at 532. At trial the court allowed the prosecutors to 
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introduce both the defendant's pager with the coded message and the police's caller I.D. 
containing the defendant's name and phone number. The Florida's Appeals Court, 
interpreting a very similar hearsay statute, ruled that "only statements made by persons 
fall within the definition of hearsay." Bowe, at 532. Interestingly enough, the language of 
that court's ruling displays the hole in this logic. It said "Subsection 90.801(1), Florida 
Statutes (2000), defines hearsay as including an out-of-court 'statement' of a 
declarant..." and "defines a 'declarant' as a 'person who makes a statement.'" Id. 
(emphasis added). While it is true that hearsay includes statements by declarants, 
according to the rule, declarants are only required for a statement if it is a nonverbal 
conduct type of statement. The courts use of the word "including" reveals the flaw in its 
reasoning. 
On motion for rehearing the Florida court came closer to conforming to the hearsay 
statute when it denied Bowe's motion for rehearing by clarifying that the information in 
the pager was a statement, and the information in the caller I.D. may have been a 
statement (if intended as an assertion), but because the prosecution did not offer them to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely that the informant wanted 40 dollars of 
cocaine or that the defendant's phone number was #######, but instead they were offered 
to "show that the recipient of the numerical message was the defendant, since the 
numbers appeared on his pager. 
Again Dunlap would argue that the Florida court misinterpreted the statute and the 
language of its own decision demonstrates that. According to these statutes, a 
declarant/person is not a necessary ingredient for a statement nor is a declarant necessary 
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for hearsay. When courts interpret their rules in this way they do it with disregard for the 
plain language of the rules and ignore the potential for out-of-court assertions to be 
admitted, for their truth, without proper reliability protection. 
Finally, the cites Wimbish v. Commonwealth, 658 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Va. App. 
2008) where the Virginia Court of Appeals held that admission of the "Certificate of 
Blood Alcohol Analysis", which contained statements made by the officer performing the 
test and the test results created by the intoxilyzer machine, did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause. With regard to the test results (the statements of the intoxilyzer), 
the court ruled that they did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not 
'testimonial' under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 
177 (2004) because the results of the test were not statements made by a witness. 
Dunlap concedes that the Virginia Court of Appeals found that the data produced 
by the intoxilyzer machine was not a "statement produced by a witness" but would 
distinguish that holding from this case because the court in Wimbish was ruling in the 
context of a Confrontation Clause claim based on the right to confront witnesses rather 
than interpreting a hearsay rule. While the hearsay rules are related to the right of 
confrontation, confrontation is a more specific rule, explicitly requiring a 'witness', 
where hearsay more broadly deals with statements. U.S. CONST, amend. VI. 
Rather than focusing on the cases of other jurisdictions, Dunlap asserts that the 
Court would be well served by considering what the alleged statement in this case is and 
what its context was in the State's case at trial. The assertion/statement is essentially that 
"Dunlap's BAC was .180 at the time he was tested." This statement was delivered at trial 
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through Randall and Thompson. R. 138: 187, 190. If asked "how do you know Dunlap's 
BAC was . 180" these witnesses must answer "because that is what the machine said" or 
more precisely "that is what the digital readout on the machine said" or "that is what was 
written on the digital screen of the machine." To argue about the language used to 
describe how the machine communicates information is to miss the point of what is 
actually happening. Instead, Dunlap encourages this Court to consider what happens the 
meaning of the information on the digital readout. 
Imagine if, instead of having intoxilyzer machines, in order to test a suspect's BAC 
the police hired a chemist who would take breath sample and perform the test exactly like 
the intoxilyzer but without the aid of a machine. Imagine the chemist directed infrared 
light through the breath sample and measured the amount of light absorbed by the alcohol 
in the sample.1 If, after the chemist had reached conclusion based on the test, he told the 
police "this guy's BAC is .180" his comment would no doubt be considered a statement. 
It would be an oral assertion of fact. The same would be true if, instead of answering out 
loud when asked for the results, the chemist typed ".180" on to his computer and showed 
the police, except it would be a written assertion. Either way, the result of the test 
communicated to the police is an assertion, alleging that a certain fact exists based on an 
analysis. 
Dunlap asserts that the chemist's assertions are exactly like the digital readout of 
the intoxilyzer. The digital readout is also, therefore, a statement, specifically a statement 
in response to a request made by the police asking, "what is this guy's BAC?" The 
1
 See Infrared Spectrometry (IR) Breath Analysis, http://alcoholtest.com/ir.htm. 
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digital readout statement of the intoxilyzer should function just like the oral or written 
statements by the chemist, as far as the hearsay rule is concerned. The fact that a person 
makes the assertion does not make it more of an assertion than if it was made by a 
machine performing the same task. What the intoxilyzer and the chemist 'say' at the end 
of the test are both assertions and both statements for the purposes of hearsay. 
If the police acted as witnesses at trial and testified that a chemist told them "this 
guy's BAC is .180" there would most certainly be a sustained objection as to hearsay. 
But, according to the trial court, not because it would be a "statement, other than one 
made by the witness at trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted," but because 
the chemist could be cross-examined. See R. 139: 203 ("I don't find it as hearsay. I don't 
see it as an out of court declaration, even if we had the machine here. I think I'm a pretty 
good cross-examiner. I don't think I could cross examine that machine."). The trial court 
used the wrong test. When considering whether the evidence was hearsay the court 
should have asked (1) was it a written or oral assertion, (2) is it from a source other than a 
declarant at trial, and (3) is it offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. This test 
conforms to the rule and does not use flawed logic to superimpose a person upon the 
definition of statement. Furthermore, this test for determining hearsay extends the 
reliability protections provided by the hearsay rule to statements made by non-persons. 
B. This Court has characterized breath test results as hearsay. 
In its brief, the State has been critical of Dunlap's use of two Utah cases where 
this Court analyzed the admission of breath alcohol test results according to the rules of 
hearsay. See Appellee's Brief at 14 fh 4. The more substantive of the two cases is Kehl v. 
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Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987) where this Court reviewed an 
administrative suspension of the defendant's driver's license. The State has called 
Dunlap's reliance on Kehl "misplaced" because the State claims it only stands for "the 
proposition that breath tests results are admissible so long as the State lays a sufficient 
foundation by introducing an affidavit or other evidence establishing that the breath test 
instrument was properly maintained and the test was administered by a qualified 
operator." Appellee's Brief at 14 fn 4 {citing Kehl, 416-17). Presumably it bases its 
argument on the language of the case where the Court noted u[i]nasmuch as Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-44.3 (1983) allows affidavits to establish the necessary foundation for 
breathalyzer evidence, it is less restrictive than the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule... [tjherefore, we examine the Department's position under" the 
administrative rule. Kehl, at 416. 
In Kehl the district court had reversed the administrative suspension and the 
Department of Public Safety was appealing that order. The Department claimed that the 
"operational checklist and the breathalyzer test result [were] admissible as public 
records." Kehl, 735 P.2d at 416. This Court found these to be "reports of a public 
agency" and as such analyzed the admission of the breathalyzer results under the public 
records exception to the hearsay rule. Kehl, at 416. The Court found that because the 
officer was not shown to be qualified to administer the test nor was it shown that the 
machine was properly calibrated the hearsay exception was not satisfied ("Consequently, 
neither report is admissible as a public record"). Kehl, at 417. When the Department tried 
to admit the test results through DUI report of the officer who performed the test and 
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observed the machine this Court characterized that attempt as trying to admit "double-
hearsay... through the back door[.]" Kehl, at 417.2 This Court clearly put the admission 
of the results of a breath test in terms of hearsay where the Department attempted to 
admit the assertion of the breathalyzer though the observation of the officer. 
The State is correct that the holding in Kehl is based on the Department's failure to 
produce a sufficient foundation for the reliability of the machine and the administration 
of the test but this Court did not limit its review to foundation. Not only were the test 
results inadmissible for a lack of proper maintenance foundation but secondarily as a 
violation of hearsay. The Department in Kehl also tried to introduce the test results 
through a written report of the officer based on the officer's observation rather than 
admitting the test results directly. These facts make Kehl, incredibly similar to this case. 
Just as in Kehl, where the State failed to meet the foundational requirements enacted by 
the legislature designed to ensure that breath test results are accurate, the State tried to 
introduce the test result evidence through the officer's observation of the machine. In 
accordance with Kehl the evidence must satisfy an exception in the hearsay rule or a 
statutory exception; here the test result evidence did not satisfy either. See Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d at 1321 (the foundational requirements of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 (1983) are 
2
 "Section X of the DUI Report form is entitled 'Chemical Tests.' This Section requires 
the arresting officer to record the results of the breathalyzer test. However, we have 
previously found the test result in this case unreliable. To allow the double-hearsay, 
ultimate conclusion of the breathalyzer test in through the back door without the 
foundational affidavits required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1983), would violate 
the spirit of Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)." Kehl, 735 P.2d at 417. 
The two levels of hearsay are the written assertion of the BAC level made by the police 
officer on the form and the assertion of the BAC level made by the machine from which 
the officer gets his information. Thus the machine is making an assertion. 
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merely a statutory exception to the hearsay rule); see also Utah R. Evid 802 ("Hearsay is 
not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules") (emphasis added). 
C. The trial court's statutory interpretation was erroneous. 
As we see in Kehl, Utah has recognized that the results of a breath test machine 
are subject to the hearsay rule and without an exception, either in the rule or designated 
by statute, may not be admitted as evidence. When the trial court ruled that the test 
results were not hearsay because the intoxilyzer could not be cross-examined it made an 
error based on an incorrect statutory interpretation. The trial court's interpretation of the 
hearsay statute is subject to a review for correctness with no particular deference as found 
in State v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 444 (citing Ward v. Richfield, 798 P.2d 757, 759 
(Utah 1990). That this error was harmful and, therefore reversible, will be discussed in 
the last section. 
Because the State failed to introduce the intoxilyzer evidence under the conditions 
set forth in R.714-500, as a statutory exception to hearsay, the evidence should have been 
excluded by the hearsay rule unless another exception applied. Because the evidence 
does not satisfy the business records or public records exceptions, or any other exception 
to the hearsay rule, the intoxilyzer test results should have been excluded. The evidence 
was introduced as out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
with no reliability protection or assurance of trustworthiness. As such the evidence 
violated the hearsay mle. The trial court committed error by admitting the evidence over 
Dunlap's objections and should be reversed. 
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III. DUNLAP'S GENERAL CHALLENGE TO THE INTOXILYZER TEST 
PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENT SAMPLE 
The State argues that because failed to specifically object to admission of the 
intoxilyzer test results on the basis of an insufficient sample the objection was not 
preserved. Appellee's Brief at 14. Dunlap agrees that neither the written motion nor oral 
objections at trial specifically identify the insufficient sample as an independent basis for 
the objection. As mentioned in the State's brief, Dunlap objected to introduction of the 
intoxilyzer test result during direct examination of Deputy Randall. R. 137: 102. Dunlap 
objected after the following exchange. Counsel for the State asked: "It didn't have 
enough of a sample?" Deputy Randall then replied: "No. It went with the amount of air 
that he had actually exhaled in the machine and registered a .180." R. 137: 102. The 
State alleges that "[a] review of the record... demonstrates that the objections were based 
on Defendant's pretrial motion claiming that the Intoxilyzer was not working properly 
due to a printer malfunction" and that after the State laid further foundation the results 
were admitted. Appellee's Brief at 13. Dunlap disagrees. Although not specifically 
preserved in the written motion or in the oral objection at trial, in context of the testimony 
directly related insufficient sample Dunlap's objection arguably preserved this issue. 
In general Dunlap was objecting to the admission of the intoxilyzer evidence on the 
basis that the State had not, and could not, lay the proper foundation as required by 
Vialpando, which includes not only evidence that the machine was operating and 
maintained properly but also that the test was performed properly. Vialpando, j^ 14. After 
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Dunlap's objection was sustained (R. 137: 102) the State proceeded to introduce 
foundation evidence related to the operation of the machine through Gaylin Moore. R. 
138: 142-82. After hearing Moore's testimony the trial court presumably found that the 
machine was operating properly, despite the broken printer, because the State was then 
allowed to admit testimony of the test results through Officer Thompson and Deputy 
Randall over Dunlap's repeated and unspecified objection. R. 138: 187. 
The question is whether Dunlap's general objection to the introduction of the 
intoxilyzer evidence sufficiently raised the issue for appeal or whether Dunlap is 
prevented from arguing the failure to administer the test properly. According to State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993), in order "for an issue to be sufficiently 
raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that 
the trial judge can consider it." (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Schultz, 2002 
UT App 366, If 19, 58 P.3d 879. Dunlap asserts that his objection to the introduction of 
the evidence immediately following the testimony that samples were insufficient raised 
the issue of proper administration to the trial court's consciousness. The court should 
have been aware that it must find that the test was performed properly, it was aware that 
Dunlap was contesting the State's admission of the test results, and it was aware that 
Dunlap objected to the test results immediately following testimony about insufficient 
samples. 
Dunlap asserts that his objections gave the trial court sufficient notice, opportunity 
and obligation to make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the 
admissibility of the intoxilyzer test results in all three of the required areas, (1) that the 
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machine was properly checked and working, (2) the test was properly administered, and 
(3) 15 minute observation period before the test, before admitting the evidence. 
Vialpando, Tf 14. Either the trial court found as a matter of law that the test need not have 
been administered properly, which prompts review for correctness, or the court found as 
a matter of fact that the test was administered correctly, despite uncontested testimony to 
the contrary, which prompts an abuse of discretion. The trial court abused its discretion 
by finding the test was administered correctly after hearing undisputed evidence that 
Dunlap never provided a sufficient sample. In either case Dunlap alleges the trial court 
erred and asks this Court to find error for failing to require the proper foundation before 
admitting the intoxilyzer test results. 
IV. ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER TEST RESULTS WAS NOT A 
HARMLESS ERROR 
The State alleges that "any error admitting the BAC was harmless" because 
evidence that Dunlap was seen stopped in his truck facing oncoming traffic, he drove 
across two lanes of traffic, he backed his truck off the road, he smelled of alcohol, acted 
belligerently, was found lying on the ground, admitted to drinking a beer, tested positive 
for some alcohol on a portable breath test, his eyes were red, his speech was slurred, he 
urinated his pants, and had trouble standing. Appellee's Brief at 16-17. The State calls 
this "overwhelming" evidence that Dunlap was incapable of safely operating his vehicle 
due to intoxication. Appellee's Brief at 16 (citing R. 114). Dunlap disagrees and points 
to relevant and factually similar case law to contradict the State's position. 
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In order to avoid rehashing matters discussed in the earlier brief Dunlap would 
merely again encourage the Court to review State v. Kinne, 2001 UT App 373, and recall 
that the Court upheld a trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider where the State failed 
to provide sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant 
was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle with very similar facts to this case. See Appellant's Brief at 19. Here 
the standard is even lower. The Court need only find that the errors below were not 
inconsequential and may have affected the outcome of the proceedings. While some 
evidence of Dunlap's incapacity was admitted at trial, Dunlap reminds the Court that 
there was not a valid set of field sobriety tests administered, nor a valid portable breath 
test result, there was no driving pattern observed other than being parked in the road, and 
the police presented none of the traditional direct evidence of incapacity. Dunlap admits 
that there is anecdotal evidence of incapacity and it is not inconceivable that a jury could 
have found him guilty without the BAC evidence, however, the amount and type of 
alternative evidence presented by the State did not rise to the level that made the BAC 
evidence inconsequential. Clearly the invalid intoxilyzer results played a significant role 
in the trial and cannot be characterized as inconsequential when compared to the rest of 
the evidence presented. 
Dunlap asserts that it is at least reasonably likely that, had the intoxilyzer test 
results been excluded, the outcome of his trial may have been more favorable. Because 
his conviction was based primarily upon the BAC evidence, and because the remainder of 
the evidence showing incapacity could arguably be explained in other ways, Dunlap 
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adamantly asserts that the admission of the BAC evidence was not inconsequential. 
Dunlap need not show that had the BAC evidence been properly excluded that he would 
have been acquitted. Instead, Dunlap asserts that he has met his burden on the 
harmfiilness issue by the fact that it is not unreasonable to suggest that an elderly man 
who suffers from illness and infirmity may have been acquitted on a DUI charge with 
evidence of driving off the road, acting belligerent, having trouble walking, urinating his 
pants and being alternatively cooperative and uncooperative with the police. These facts 
support Dunlap's claim that the alternative evidence was not overwhelming and therefore 
the intoxilyzer evidence was not inconsequential making the error harmful. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The results of the intoxilyzer test were admitted improperly according to R.714-
500 because the machine was malfunctioning, the printed results were not presented or 
even created, and the test was not administered properly. The trial court erred by 
allowing the State to admit the BAC evidence. In the event that the trial court admitted 
the police officers' testimony of the intoxilyzer results merely as an eyewitness account 
of the digital readout, rather than as reliable test results according to R.714-500, the trial 
court erred and abused its discretion by denying Dunlap's objections to hearsay because 
the evidence was derived from out-of-court assertions of facts offered to prove the truth 
of the assertion. 
These errors and abuse of discretion constituted harmful error because admission 
of the intoxilyzer test results was a significant factor at trial. The proper exclusion of the 
test results would have created a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
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Dunlap. Accordingly, Dunlap asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand this 
case to the District Court for further proceedings with instructions for the exclusion of the 
intoxilyzer test results. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \?_ day of March, 2010. 
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Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 1$) East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854, thisj> day of 
March, 2010. 
> ? ^ . , 
^ 
24 
ADDENDA 
• Note from Sergeant Michael Irvine, Representative for the Commissioner of 
Public Safety and Director of the Intoxilyzer Certification Program 
• Standard Operating Procedures for Alcohol Technicians 
GARY HERBERT 
Governor 
GREG BELL 
Lieutenant Governor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
COLONEL DANIEL FUHR 
Superintendent 
February 1,2010 
To Whom It may concern: 
In accordance to rule 714-500-6- D this is the Standard Operating Procedures for the 40-day 
calibration check done by the Alcohol Technicians. 
Sincerely 
Sergeant Michael Irvine 
Representative for the 
Commissioner of Public Safety 
Utah of Utah 
Operating Procedures: 
The Alcohol Technician will complete the following during Instrument Certification 
Certification Report Line 10, Simulator Solution: 
• Check solution lot number and expiration date. 
Certification Report Line 1, Electrical Power Check: 
• Take steps to reach the 'Tush Button to Start Test" (5000) or "Ready Mode" (8000) confirming 
that the electrical power system is functioning properly. 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 2, Internal Temperature Check: 
• When Intoxilyzer display reads "Push Button To Start Test" (5000) or Ready Mode" (8000) this 
confirms that the internal temperature is at standard. 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 6 Diagnostic Check: (and) 
Certification Report Line 4, Internal Calibration Check: 
• Begin a diagnostic check and verify the results all display "Passed (5000) or "Pass (8000). 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 8, Reference Sample Check: 
• Using a wet-bath simulator 
* Run a series of three known reference sample checks. Results within 5% or 0.005 of the 
target value, whichever is greater, indicate that the Intoxilyzer has passed. 
* If results are outside of 5% or 0.005, check the simulator and repeat checks. 
* If results remain outside the 5% or 0.005, replace the solution and repeat checks. 
* If results remain outside the 5% or 0,005, utilize a second wet-bath simulator. 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 9, Printout Verification Check: 
• Verify the Intoxilyzer gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath on the printout. 
Certification Report Line 3, Internal Purge Check: 
• Ensure the Intoxilyzer begins a test routine by drawing an air blank and purging the system. 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 5, Invalid Test Check: 
• While in the air blank mode, press the Start Test button. Verify the display reads "Invalid Test" 
(5000) or ''Sequence Aborted" (8000), discontinues the test and prints "Invalid Test". 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 7, Exemption Checks: 
• Perform the following Exception checks: 
* Blow into the Intoxilyzer at the wrong time to verify it will detect a sample introduced at an 
improper time. 
* Hold a solution containing ethanol near the breath sample tube during an air blank cycle to 
verify the Intoxilyzer will detect ambient alcohol vapor. 
* During a test routine. Place a small amount of an ethanol solution in the mouth. When the 
Intoxilyzer reads "Please Blow". Verify that the slope detector functions properly. 
* If the Intoxilyzer does not pass, attempt repairs or remove it from service. 
Certification Report Line 11, Final Results: 
• Complete and submit Certification Report. 
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